Analysis of the Agents’ Features Influence on the Optimal Pricing in Bilateral Market
The article presents an analysis of foreign studies on bilateral markets and review of works dedicated to research of the optimal pricing principles and assessment of the influence of the agents’ features on the intermediary firm behaviour. The core article, “Platforms Competition in the Bilateral Market”, written by Jean-Charles Roche and Jean Tirol, was published in 2003. Basic models were dedicated to analyzing the influence of the demand elasticity and the magnitude of the network external effect on the optimal pricing of an intermediary firm. In process of enriching scientific understanding of the fundamentals of bilateral markets functioning, attention was focused on analyzing the influence exerted by various types of agents’ expectations or by the presence of loyal agents in the group. In addition, in the course of work, it was concluded that the main decision, in terms of the pricing structure, that the intermediary company needs to take, is the division of agents into a subsidized group and an exploited group
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