DOI: https://doi.org/10.33917/es-6.186.2022.52-65

“The world will never be the same again,” says the overwhelming majority of socially active Russians, referring to the “old world” as the planetary community until February 24, 2022. At the same time, the most rapid, cardinal, unmistakably projected transformations are announced as crucial tasks for Russia all Russian life support systems and accelerated modernization. The most important of them, according to the authors of the article, is the logistics project proposed in 2006 by Academicians of the Russian Academy of Sciences V.A. Sadovnichim and G.V. Osipov, which in the new edition is presented in the article as “United Eurasia – Transsib 2.0”. It is based on the concept of the spatial economy, which is made up of transnational megaprojects that have been successfully implemented over the past 70 years.

“United Eurasia — Transsib 2.0” at the initial stage is intended to overcome the attempts of Europe and the United States to implement a transport blockade of the Russian Federation. Such a blockade could hinder the development of our country, which would lead to a decrease in the living standards of the population and, as Russia’s enemies suggest, corrosion of national unity and consolidation of the masses with power structures after the start of the military operation to liberate Donbass. In the future, after the successful solution of the Russian transport problems proper, the proposed logistics project can successfully develop as a transcontinental one, linking different regions of the world along new economically and politically promising vectors and directions. In particular, we can talk about pairing with the Chinese logistics corridor “Silk Road”, to counter which at the June G7 summit in South Bavaria, the countries of the “golden billion” proposed to allocate unprecedented investments of 0 billion.

The article contains a list of the main threats to the Russian Federation, consisting of 10 points, and a summary of their prompt relief with subsequent complete elimination. The technology for the implementation of the megaproject “United Eurasia — Transsib 2.0” has been prescribed — along with budgetary financing of the new Transsib, it is planned to attract investments from the regional budgets of those entities through which the proposed route will pass, as well as to co-finance the capital of private investors and issue marketable “Trans-Siberian” loan bonds.

Obviously, after conducting a special military operation in Ukraine, Russia will have to equip its Eurasian space between Europe and East Asia in the shortest possible time in the neighborhood of five civilizations — Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Shinto and Buddhist — so that it can finally become a territory of safe solidarity development.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.33917/es-6.186.2022.38-51

The present paper follows up an earlier study on modeling and assessing the national strength of the world countries. This integral index is the most informative and popular indicator in the world that characterizes the aggregate potential of a particular country and at the same time makes it possible to compare the level of its power and socio-economic development with similar indicators of other states.

In the past national strength calculations were carried out by well-known political figures, such as foreign policy strategist and director (from 1975 to 2013) of the main Office of Net Assessment (ONA) of the US Department of Defence, Andrew Marshall [1], founder of political realism, Nicholas John Spekeman [2], one of the leading US foreign policy experts, Hans Morgenthau [3], founder of neorealism theory Kenneth Neil Waltz [4], author of the theory of offensive realism John Mearsheimer [5] and others. To date, dozens of methods for assessing national strength have been developed, the first of which was put forward in 1741. In the article first of all we’ll consider the most well-known foreign results and then present our own ones. In our opinion, it is important to make calculations of the integral indicator of national strength on an ongoing basis, as well as to compare our country’s potential with alternative estimates of analytical centers of geopolitical opponents.

References:

1. Marshall A.W. A Program to Improve Analytic Methods related to Strategic Forces. Policy Sciences, 1982, no 15(1), pp. 47–50, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00143367.

2. Spykman N.J. America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (1942; reprint, Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1970).

3. Morgenthau H.J. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954.

4. Waltz K.H. Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979.

5. Mearsheimer J.J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. N.Y., L., W.W. Norton & Company, 2001.

6. Correlates of War, available at: https://correlatesofwar.org.

7. Power. U.S. News & World Report, available at: https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/rankings/power.

8. Methodology: How the 2022 Best Countries Were Ranked. U.S. News & World Report, available at: https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/methodology.

9. Most Powerful Countries 2022. World Population Review, available at: https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/most-powerful-countries.

10. About WPI. The World Power Index, available at: https://www.worldpowerindex.com/about-world-power-index/

11. Past Years. Lowy Institute Asia Power Index, available at: https://power.lowyinstitute.org/data/power.

12. What is Power. Lowy Institute Asia Power Index, available at: https://power.lowyinstitute.org/methodology/

13. Moyer J.D., Markle A. Relative national power codebook, version 7.2.2018. Denver, CO: Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, 2018.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.33917/es-6.186.2022.30-35

Changing of a conjuncture index of “Economic strategy” (CIES) for nine months of 2020 is considered. The contribution of indicators of supply and demand in CIES is estimated. The analysis of industrial production is carried out.

References:

1. Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii v yanvare — sentyabre 2022 goda [Socio-economic Situation in Russia in January — September 2022]. Federal’naya sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki, available at: https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/osn-09-2022.pdf.

2. Frenkel’ A.A., Tikhomirov B.I., Surkov A.A. Yanvar’ — mai 2022 goda: Rossiya v usloviyakh tormozheniya sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya [2022, January — May: Russia in the Context of Slowing Down Socio-economic Development]. Ekonomicheskie strategii, 2022, vol. 24, no 4, pp. 90–95, DOI: https://doi.org/10.33917/es-4.184.2022.90-95.

3. Informatsiya o soveshchanii Prezidenta RF s chlenami Pravitel’stva RF 16 noyabrya 2022 g. v rezhime videokonferentsii [Information on the Meeting of the President of the Russian Federation with Members of the RF Government on November 16, 2022 Via Videoconference]. Ofitsial’nyi sait Prezidenta RF, available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69847.

4. Prognoz sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii na 2023 god i na planovyi period 2024 i 2025 godov [Forecast of the Socio-economic Development of the Russian Federation for 2023 and for the Scheduled Period of 2024 and 2025]. Ministerstvo ekonomicheskogo razvitiya RF, 2022, 28 sentyabrya, available at: https://economy.gov.ru/material/file/ea2fd3ce38f2e28d51c312acf2be0917/prognoz_socialno_ekonom_razvitiya_rf_2023-2025.pdf.

5. Informatsiya o Plenarnom zasedanii Peterburgskogo mezhdunarodnogo ekonomicheskogo foruma s uchastiem Prezidenta RF 17 iyunya 2022 g. [Information on the Plenary Meeting of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum with Participation of the President of the Russian Federation on June 17, 2022]. Ofitsial’nyi sait Prezidenta RF, available at: kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68669.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.33917/es-6.186.2022.26-29

Sanctions against the Russian Federation have created fundamentally new conditions for the functioning of the Russian economy.

This poses new challenges, which require government spendings increase. It appears that Russian regulators have unused mechanisms, the use of which will provide the economy with new money, without complicating the situation of other sectors. The article suggests mechanisms that highlights internal sources of liquidity formation for the economy. In the environment of sanctions, such mechanisms also increase the independence of monetary policy from external constraints.

References:

1. Kommentarii Banka Rossii po operatsiyam na rynke gosudarstvennogo dolga [Bank of Russia’s Commentary on Operations in the Government Debt Market]. Bank of Russia, 2022, 18 marta, available at: http://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=12763.

2. TsB RF [Central Bank of the Russian Federation]. Obzor riskov finansovykh rynkov, 2022, no 2–3(60–61), fevral’-mart.

3. Bank Rossii. Osnovnye napravleniya edinoi gosudarstvennoi denezhno-kreditnoi politiki na 2023 god i period 2024 i 2025 godov: Proekt ot 11 avgusta 2022 g. [Bank of Russia. Guidelines for the Single State Monetary Policy for 2023 and the Period of 2024 and 2025: the Draft of August 11, 2022]. Bank Rossii, pp. 24–25, available at: https://cbr.ru/about_br/publ/ondkp/on_2023_2025/

4. Ershov M.V. Kakaya ekonomicheskaya politika nuzhna Rossii v usloviyakh sanktsii? [What Kind of Economic Policy does Russia Need in the Face of Sanctions?]. Voprosy ekonomiki, 2014, no 12, pp. 37–53.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.33917/es-6.186.2022.16-25

Forecasting the ruble exchange dynamics appears objectively necessary for shaping both the medium-term financial strategy of industry corporations and the general strategic course for occupying leading positions in sectors of business interest, including through the use of new financial instruments, new markets and, in general, a system of strategic planning of socio-economic development of Russia. However, in today’s realities, according to most experts, with whom we cannot but agree, the task of forecasting seems extremely difficult and appears complicated by the fact that the launched crises are unpredictable and are characterized by a diverse nature (pandemic and geopolitical crises, expansion of trade wars and sanctions). In such conditions, when uncertainty grows excessively, it is important to turn to the accumulated experience: to analyze to what extent the available models can be suitable for prospective assessments in the current environment.

References:

1. Kuranov G.O. Metodicheskie voprosy kratkosrochnoi otsenki i prognoza makroekonomicheskikh pokazatelei [Methodological Issues of Short-Term Assessment and Forecast of Macroeconomic Indicators]. Voprosy statistiki, 2018, no 25(2), pp. 3–24.

2. Frenkel’ A.A., Volkova N.N., Surkov A.A., Romanyuk E.I. Sravnitel’nyi analiz modifitsirovannykh metodov Greindzhera — Ramanatkhana i Beitsa — Greindzhera dlya postroeniya ob”edinennogo prognoza dinamiki ekonomicheskikh pokazatelei [Comparative Analysis of Modified Granger-Ramanathan and Bates-Granger Methods for Developing a Combined Forecast of Economic Indicators Dynamics]. Voprosy statistiki, 2019, no 26(8), pp. 14–27.

3. Shirov A.A. Makrostrukturnyi analiz i prognozirovanie v sovremennykh usloviyakh razvitiya ekonomiki [Macrostructural Analysis and Forecasting under Current Conditions of Economic Development]. Problemy prognozirovaniya, 2022, no 5, pp. 43–57.

4. Dmitrieva M.V., Suetin S.N. Modelirovanie dinamiki ravnovesnykh valyutnykh kursov [Simulating the Dynamics of Equilibrium Exchange Rates]. Vestnik KIGIT, 2012, no 12–2(30), pp. 061–064.

5. Linkevich E.F. Mirovaya valyutnaya sistema: poliinstrumental’nyi standart [World Monetary System: Polyinstrumental Standard]. Krasnodar, 2014, pp. 82–91.

6. Ageev A.I., Loginov E.L. Izmenenie strategii operirovaniya dollarom: zapusk SShA novogo kreditno-investitsionnogo tsikla vo vzaimosvyazi s valyutnymi voinami [Changing the Strategy of Dollar Handling: US Launch of New Credit-Investment Cycle in Association with the Currency Wars]. Ekonomicheskie strategii, 2015, no 3(129), pp. 20–35.

7. Fedorova E.A., Lazarev M.P. Vliyanie tseny na neft’ na finansovyi rynok Rossii v krizisnyi period [Impact of Oil Prices on the Financial Market of Russia During the Crisis]. Finansy i kredit, 2014, № 20(596), pp. 14–22.

8. Kuz’min A.Yu. Valyutnye kursy: v poiskakh strategicheskogo ravnovesiya [Exchange Rates: in Search of Strategic Equilibrium]. Ekonomicheskie strategii, 2018, no 1, pp. 82–91.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.33917/es-6.186.2022.4-5