DOI: https://doi.org/10.33917/es.2.182.2022.32-38

The article focuses on changes in global markets induced by digitalization of economy that caused new challenges to antimonopoly regulation. In this context, the author considers digital platforms and use of algorithmic pricing by economic entities. The author proposes to delineate between different types of platforms and their classification in platforms — exchanges or trade spots and multisided markets and to assess the impact of both types on competition. The article also considers the use of digital algorithms by entities as a factor of concerted conduct and implicit collusion among the market participants. In this context, the author attempts to assess the influence of humans and algorithms on sustainability of implicit collusion.

Both problems are considered in the context of global scale of entities. It limits possibilities of law enforcement against their monopolistic conduct by national competition authorities, as well as national sovereignty when faced with global corporations. In conclusion, the author stresses the necessity of search of new means of countering monopolization in digital markets

Источники:

1. ICN 2021, available at: https://icn2021budapest.hu/site/#

2. Ageev A.I. Kartina mira [Picture of the World]. Ekonomicheskie strategii, 2019, no 4, p. 5, available at: /wp-content/mag_archive/2019_04/ES2019-04-Slovo.pdf.

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4. Competition Policy. European Commission. Case AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping), available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39740.

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6. Transcript of FTC Hearings Session No. 7: Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century — Day 2. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N 19-84 (Nov. 14, 2018), available at: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1418693/ftc_hearings_session_7_transcript_day_2_11-14-18_0.pdf.

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DOI: 10.33917/es-8.166.2019.76-82

Analyzing development of the global industry for servicing agricultural production and formation of international value chains around it, the article substantiates the thesis on formation of exploitation relations within the chains. To this end, the most important innovations in the field of biotechnology, development of their patent-licensed protection system and structural regrouping of the most important companies — players in the global agrochemical market are examined in interrelation with one another over a period of the last forty years. On this basis, formation of oligopolistic structure of international companies, controlling the key links of the chain, which are infrastructural in relation to the others, is shown. Combined with the synergistic effect of the batch sale of technologically heterogeneous goods and services, this creates conditions for monopolistic exploitation of agricultural producers. The latter do not have access to alternative sources of similar goods and services that are competitive in comparison with the “packages” offered by oligopolists. As a result, for each unit of invested capital, the income of the latter is greater than that of agricultural producers, that is, within the chain the income is redistributed in their favour, including funds from end-consumers. The given monopoly is bilateral in nature, as technology companies also transfer part of their income to market leaders, who buy these technologies, for the right of access to their marketing opportunities.